Missile Defense Debate: Is Golden Dome a Risky Gamble?

The crux of the current debate regarding U.S. missile defense systems lies in the focus on protecting against threats from rogue states and accidental missile launches while excluding the capabilities aimed at countering China or Russia, according to Representative DesJarlais. He criticized the policy of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) as outdated.

An amendment proposed by Moulton regarding nuclear deterrence did not pass during the committee’s voice vote, nor did another offering aimed at slowing the development of space-based interceptors.

However, one of Moulton’s amendments did receive approval to move forward. This amendment, slated for reconciliation with the Senate, would prevent the Pentagon from establishing a privatized or subscription-based missile defense capability, asserting that the U.S. military should maintain ownership and operation of such systems.

The House Armed Services Committee ultimately voted 55–2 in favor of sending the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to the House floor. Following this, lawmakers will reconcile the differences between the House and Senate versions before forwarding the final bill to President Trump for his signature.

Discrepancies in Estimates

The White House estimates that the missile defense initiative, known as the Golden Dome, will cost $175 billion over three years, marking just the beginning of a potentially larger financial commitment. The program, which will eventually involve thousands of satellites and a global network of sensors and interceptors, may incur costs up to $542 billion over two decades, according to Congressional Budget Office reports.

One significant concern surrounding these estimates is the Pentagon’s indecision regarding the system architecture. The proposed framework includes an intricate network of satellites designed to detect and track missile launches, along with numerous interceptors capable of neutralizing threats in space and during their initial flight phase.

The Pentagon plans to increase its inventory of sea- and ground-based interceptors to eliminate threats, including missiles, drones, and aircraft approaching U.S. soil. All these systems will require integration into a complex command and control network that is still under development.

Central questions remain about the operational specifics of the Golden Dome. Will the space-based interceptors deploy kinetic kill vehicles for destruction, or will they utilize directed energy weapons, like lasers, for incapacitation? The quantity of interceptors necessary for effective defense also remains unaddressed.

Despite these uncertainties, congressional Republicans allocated $25 billion for the Pentagon to commence work on the Golden Dome initiative as part of the Trump-supported One Big Beautiful Bill Act, which passed with a party-line vote last month.

Moulton holds a physics bachelor’s degree and master’s degrees in business and public administration from Harvard University. He served as a platoon leader in the Marine Corps during the Iraq War and was one of the first Marines to reach Baghdad in 2003. Moulton previously ran for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2020 but withdrew before the primaries.

The following is an excerpt from an interview with Moulton, lightly edited for brevity and clarity.

Ars: One of your amendments that passed would prevent the Department of Defense from utilizing a subscription model for the Golden Dome. What motivated you to introduce that amendment?

Moulton: We received suggestions that the administration was exploring this model, accompanied by reports in mid-April about companies like SpaceX partnering with Anduril and Palantir to offer subscription services. The government should own the defense systems—we cannot rely on private companies for essential military decisions.

Ars: To clarify, you believe military operations should be managed by the government and armed forces rather than contractors?

Moulton: Absolutely. I’ve held this stance for a long time, especially during my service in Iraq. When it comes to nuclear weapons, that belief is paramount.

Ars: You proposed an amendment aimed at reaffirming the nuclear deterrence strategy, which did not pass. What was the intent behind it?

Moulton: This was essential for justifying the significant financial allocations for the Golden Dome. There is no defined plan or cost estimate for it, nor has it been demonstrated how it will promote strategic stability. Evidence suggests it could undermine that stability, potentially leading our adversaries to doubt the effectiveness of Mutual Assured Destruction and to act more recklessly in nuclear confrontations.

For instance, should Russian officials believe we might engage in a nuclear conflict, they could launch an attack on Golden Dome interceptors, leading to catastrophic outcomes.

I raised two key points about Golden Dome: either the nuclear theorists of the past were mistaken, and President Trump has corrected the course based on his own convictions, or the motivations are dubious, likening it to a desire for his own version of a defense system similar to Israel’s Iron Dome.

I am open to being persuaded that Golden Dome offers a viable solution. Still, nobody has provided a compelling argument yet. Furthermore, a Russian attack would likely outpace any defensive response we could muster, and I do not want to gamble on the lives of American citizens in that scenario.

Ars: What would be the proper procedure for an administration to propose a system like Golden Dome, beyond using an executive order?

Moulton: It should stem from a comprehensive strategic review, supported by extensive analysis and discussion in Congress. Proposals for new defense systems should be presented openly, with administration officials prepared to address challenging inquiries.

Ars: It’s surprising the administration has yet to release an architecture plan after missing several deadlines.

Moulton: Establishing a coherent architecture for an ill-conceived plan is inherently challenging.

Ars: Some retired military officials support Golden Dome but are critical of the administration’s segmented approach, fearing it could politicize important national security matters.

Moulton: I believe directed energy weapons, such as lasers and microwaves, could change the calculus, making defense less costly than offensive capabilities, which historically, have been cheaper to develop.

The efficacy of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of the 1970s stemmed from recognizing that an arms race inevitably leads to the proliferation of offensive capabilities designed to counter defensive measures. The prior ease of developing offensive systems highlights why that treaty was essential.

I aimed to provide some insight into a potential rationalization for the administration. However, they seem oblivious to the implications for national security.

Ars: In light of recent discussions about counter-space capabilities, do you view the development of weapons for potential use against satellites as necessary or destabilizing?

Moulton: I long for a time when there was no weaponization of space, as outlined in international agreements. Unfortunately, the real-world dynamics necessitate preparedness against adversaries who flout these agreements.

Ars: Are there additional space policy concerns that are currently on your radar?

Moulton: There are numerous critical issues in space policy—from promotion policies within the Space Force to acquisition reforms and rules of engagement. Much is happening in this arena, but a significant concern remains the potential hazards posed by the Golden Dome initiative.